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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 8, 2009, the University of Florida Gators defeated the University
of Oklahoma Sooners in Miami, Florida to win the Bowl Championship Series

* Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
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(“BCS”) Championship Game.1 As a result of their victory, the Gators were
named the Associated Press National Champions after capturing forty eight out of
a possible sixty five first place votes. 2 The win on the football field gave the
Gators their second national championship in three seasons, but it also reignited a
debate about the inherent fairness of the BCS system: whether the BCS violates
antitrust law, and whether the federal government should interject and force the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) to create a system in which a
national champion is determined in a different manner.3
In the months leading up to the 2009 BCS Championship Game, college
football pundits, internet bloggers, sports reporters, politicians, and President
Barack Obama all extolled the virtues and the follies of implementing a playoff
system in college football and eliminating the BCS. 4 Arising out of these
discussions and the incongruent results on the football field, three separate bills
have been introduced into the House of Representatives with the goal of each bill
being to help bring an end to the BCS and to implement a playoff system for
Division IA college football.5
This paper will seek to identify and discuss two primary issues as well as
answer follow up questions that arise throughout. The first issue to be discussed is
whether the BCS and the NCAA have violated any antitrust laws and, if they have,
whether or not it is beneficial to put these anticompetitive practices to rest as a
practical matter. The second issue revolves around whether Congressional
mandates would solve the perceived problems and force major college football to
determine its national champion through a playoff.

1

Pete Thamel, Florida Raises Another Trophy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B10.
See id. In addition to Florida receiving first place votes, the University of Utah received sixteen
first place votes and the University of Southern California, the University of Texas and the University
of Oklahoma each received one first place vote. Id.
3
The University of Utah Utes finished the season undefeated by beating the University of
Alabama Crimson Tide 31-17 in the Sugar Bowl. Ray Glier, No. 7 Utah 31, No. 4 Alabama 17; Perfect
Utah Rolls Past Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage
.html?res=9F0DEFDA1F3DF930A35752C0A96F9C8B63&scp=2&sq=Utah+uteu&st=nyt.
Because
the Utes did not finish the regular season in either first or second place of the BCS standings, they were
not invited to the Championship Game. The Florida Gators and the Oklahoma Sooners, on the other
hand, finished the regular season 12-1 after losing to the Mississippi State Bulldogs and the University
of Texas, respectively.
4
During a Monday Night Football telecast on November 3, 2008, Obama was interviewed by
Chris Berman of Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (“ESPN”) and stated that the one
thing he would change about sports is that he would like to see a college football playoff system
implemented. Obama Wants Playoff; McCain to Stop Performance-Enhancing Drugs, ESPN, Nov. 3,
2008, http:// sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=3680895. He advocated an eight team playoff
with the winner of the tournament being crowned the national championship. Id. He also stated that he
was “fed up with [those] computer rankings.” Id. Both candidates appeared on the telecast the night
before the 2008 Presidential election and advocated for political and Congressional assistance with
current issues in the sports world. Id.
5
Leslie Bauknight Nixon, Playoff or Bust: The Bowl Championship Series Debate Hits Congress
(Again), 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 365, 366 (2009).
2
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THE PARTICIPANTS

A. The NCAA
Football spawned the creation of the NCAA. 6 The first incarnation of the
NCAA was founded in late 1905 under the mandates of President Theodore
Roosevelt as a response to the rugged, rough, and sometimes deadly nature of
collegiate football.7 As a follow up to the president’s demands, sixty two
institutions created the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(“IAAUS”) whose purpose was to initiate change in the rules of collegiate
football.8 As the IAAUS grew, it began concerning itself with other college
athletics and, in 1910, it changed its name to the NCAA and became a rulesmaking and discussion body for several different sports. 9 In 1921, it hosted its first
national championship of any kind and, in the ensuing years, has added more
sports under its umbrella as the primary collegiate athletics governing body. 10
Since the NCAA began regulating and governing college football,
universities and colleges around the country have gained membership in to the
NCAA which regulates player eligibility rules and strives to provide a regulated
playing field for all teams.11 Since 1973, college football has been broken down
into three distinct divisions, and since 1978, Division I has been broken down into
two subdivisions: the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) and the Football
Championship Subdivision (“FCS”).12 The Division I FBS schools are all colleges
and universities whose football programs participate in postseason bowl games
rather than participate in the playoff system of the FCS, which is run by the

6
JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N’S FIRST
CENTURY 1 (Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 2006, Digital Ed.).
7
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, History of the Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, http://NCAA
.org/wps/NCAA?key=/NCAA/NCAA/about+the+NCAA/ overview/history.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2010).
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2009-10 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Division I Manual 1
(2009), http://www.NCAApublications.com/ productdownloads/D110.pdf [hereinafter Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n Manual].
12
See id. The three divisions are Division I, Division II, and Division III. Beginning in 1978,
Division I was broken down further into Division IA and Division IAA, with the Division IAA having a
championship tournament at the end of the season while Division IA retained the traditional bowl
format. Timothy Kober, Comment, Too Many Men on the Field: Why Congress Should Punt on the
Antitrust Debate Overshadowing Collegiate Football and the Bowl Championship Series, 15 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 57, 58-59 (2005). In 2006, the Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n changed the
subdivisions of Division I from Division IA and Division IAA to the Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision and Division I Football Championship Subdivision, respectively, in order to make the
names more accurately reflect the end of season contests. Steve Wieberg, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n to Rename College Football Subdivisions, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-08-03-NCAA -subdivisions_x.htm. The criteria for each
division remained the same as under the previous designations. Id. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, What’s the Difference Between Division I, II, and III?, http://www.NCAA
.org/wps/NCAA?key=/NCAA/NCAA/about+the+NCAA/membership/div_criteria.html (last visited
Jan. 7, 2010).
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NCAA.13 Under the bowl system, the NCAA does not technically organize any of
the bowls, but, in order for a bowl to host a game between NCAA member
institutions, that bowl must be authorized by the NCAA.14 Beginning in 1998, the
BCS, in conjunction with the commissioners of the various FBS conferences and
the NCAA, was implemented in order “to pair the two top-rated teams in a national
championship game and to create competitive match-ups among highly regarded
teams in three other games as part of the bowl system.”15 While there have been
tweaks to the system since 1998, the BCS still governs the major bowl games and
dictates which two teams will play in the BCS Championship Game.16 The NCAA
has used this system to organize and administer FBS college football.
B. NCAA Division I FBS Member Institutions
The NCAA FBS member institutions are universities and colleges organized
into eleven collegiate athletic conferences.17 The conferences are: the Atlantic
Coast Conference (“ACC”),18 the Big East Conference (“Big East”),19 the Big Ten
Conference (“Big 10”),20 the Big Twelve Conference (“Big 12”),21 Conference

13
Press Release, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
Q&A on Postseason Football (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.NCAA.org/wps/NCAA?key=/NCAA
/NCAA/Media+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Release+Archive/2006/Miscellaneous/NCAA+Q_A+o
n+Postseason+Football.
14
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Manual, supra note 11, at 287.
15
BCS, BCS Chronology, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/history (last visited Jan. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter BCS Chronology].
16
Joe Drape, BCS Adds Fifth Game and Access for Have-Nots, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2004, at D1.
The major change implemented was to add an extra game to the format. Id. This would add an
additional two openings for teams not already assured of a spot in the BCS bowl games. Id.
17
See Nixon, supra note 5, at 369.
18
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Sports Sponsorship:
Football Bowl Subdivision, http://web1.NCAA .org/online Dir/exec/sponsorship (last visited Jan. 7,
2010). The ACC consists of Boston College, Clemson University, Duke University, Florida State
University, Georgia Institute of Technology, University of Maryland – College Park, University of
Miami (Florida), North Carolina State University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
University of Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, and Wake Forest University.
Id.
19
See id. The Big East consists of University of Cincinnati, University of Connecticut, University
of Louisville, University of Pittsburgh, Rutgers – State University of New Jersey – New Brunswick,
University of South Florida, Syracuse University, and West Virginia. Id.
20
See id. The Big 10 consists of University of Illinois – Champaign, Indiana University –
Bloomington, University of Iowa, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of
Minnesota – Twin Cities, Northwestern University, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State
University, Purdue University, and University of Wisconsin – Madison. Id. Beginning with the 2011
season, the University of Nebraska Cornhuskers will begin playing in the Big 10. Leslie Reed,
Huskers’ Big Ten Move Official, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, June 11, 2010, available at http://
www.owh.com/article/20100611/SPORTS/306119924.
21
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. The Big 12 consists of Baylor University,
University of Colorado – Boulder, Iowa State University, University of Kansas, Kansas State
University, University of Missouri – Colombia, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, University of
Oklahoma, Oklahoma State University, Texas A & M University – College Station, Texas Tech
University, and University of Texas – Austin. Id. In June 2010, both the University of Nebraska
Cornhuskers and University of Colorado Buffaloes accepted offers to move to other conferences. See
Reed, supra note 20; Tom Kensler, CU, Pac 10 Have a Certain Ring to Them, DENVER POST, June 12,
2010, available at http://www.denverpost.com/sports/ ci_15281580.
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USA (“C-USA”),22 the Mid-American Conference (“MAC”),23 the Mountain West
Conference (“MWC”),24 the Pacific-Ten Conference (“Pac 10”),25 the
Southeastern Conference (“SEC”),26 the Sun Belt Conference (“Sun Belt”),27 and
the Western Athletic Conference (“WAC”).28 The University of Notre Dame, the
United States Naval Academy, and the United States Military Academy are not a
part of a conference affiliated with the FBS, but continue to compete with FBS

22
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. C-USA consists of University of Alabama at
Birmingham, University of Central Florida, East Carolina University, University of Houston, Marshall
University, University of Memphis, Rice University, Southern Methodist University, University of
Southern Mississippi, University of Texas – El Paso, Tulane University, and University of Tulsa. Id.
23
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. The MAC consists of University of Akron,
Ball State University, Bowling Green State University, University at Buffalo – the State University of
New York, Central Michigan University, Eastern Michigan University, Kent State University, Miami
University (Ohio), Northern Illinois University, Ohio University, Temple University, University of
Toledo, and Western Michigan University. Id.
24
See id. The MWC consists of Brigham Young University, Colorado State University, University
of Nevada – Las Vegas, University of New Mexico, San Diego State University, Texas Christian
University (“TCU”), United States Air Force Academy, University of Utah, and University of
Wyoming. Id. Starting with the 2011 season, the Boise State University Broncos are scheduled to
move to the MWC, while the Fresno State Bulldogs and University of Nevada Wolfpack are scheduled
to join the conference in either 2011 or 2012. Andy Katz et al., Nevada, Fresno State Move to MWC,
ESPN, Aug. 18, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/NCAA /news/story?id=5474774. Furthermore, the
Utah Utes will be moving to the Pac 10 Conference. Id. Finally, Brigham Young University
announced that they will be leaving the MWC to become an independent in football beginning in 2011.
Andy Katz, BYU Leaving MWC for 2011-12 Season, ESPN, Aug. 31, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/
NCAA/news/story?id=5517305.
25
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. The Pac 10 consists of University of
Arizona, Arizona State University, University of California – Berkeley, University of California – Los
Angeles, University of Oregon, Oregon State University, University of Southern California, Stanford
University, University of Washington, and Washington State University. Id. In June 2010, the Pac 10
Conference attempted to expand as it invited the University of Utah Utes, University of Colorado
Buffaloes, University of Texas Longhorns, Texas A&M University Aggies, Texas Tech University Red
Raiders, University of Oklahoma Sooners, and the Oklahoma State Cowboys to join the conference.
Chuck Carlton, Texas Turns Down Pac 10; Big 12 Schools Have Framework of Deal, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 14, 2010, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/spt
/stories/061510dnspoblogcoll. a2975b0c.html. The University of Utah Utes and the University of
Colorado Buffaloes accepted the offer to join the Pac 10 beginning in 2011. Lya Wodraska, Utah
Officially Accepts Pac 10 Invitation, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/sports/49781044-75/utah-utes-pac-scott.html.csp; see John Henderson,
Colorado Buffaloes to Join Pac 10 Conference Next Year, DENVER POST, Sept. 21, 2010 available at
http://www.denverpost.com/sports/ci_16134205?source=rss.
26
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. The SEC consists of University of Alabama
– Tuscaloosa, University of Arkansas – Fayetteville, Auburn University, University of Florida,
University of Georgia, University of Kentucky, Louisiana State University, University of Mississippi,
Mississippi State University, University of South Carolina – Columbia, University of Tennessee –
Knoxville, and Vanderbilt University. Id.
27
See id. The Sun Belt consists of Arkansas State University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida
International University, Louisiana at Lafayette, University of Louisiana at Monroe, Middle Tennessee
State University, University of North Texas, Troy University, and Western Kentucky University. Id.
28
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N .org, supra note 18. The WAC consists of
Boise State University, California State University – Fresno, University of Hawaii – Manoa, University
of Idaho, Louisiana Tech University, University of Nevada – Reno, New Mexico State University, San
Jose State University, and Utah State University. Id. By 2012, the Boise State University Broncos,
Fresno State University Bulldogs, and University of Nevada Wolfpack will have completed moves to
the MWC. See Katz, supra note 24.
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institutions and are eligible for the BCS if they qualify. 29
C. The Bowl Championship Series
The BCS was first established in order to provide major college football with
a championship game within the framework of the traditional bowl system. The
BCS was formed on the back of both the Bowl Coalition and the Bowl Alliance
which had also attempted to create a way to provide college football with a
consensus national champion. All three of these systems relied on polling to
determine which teams would be considered the national champions after all of the
bowl games were played.
1. The Early Days of Polls and Bowl Games
Since the beginning of organized college football, several polls have been
created in order to rank the college football teams throughout the country. 30 These
ranking systems rely upon mathematical formulae as well as the opinions of
sportswriters throughout the country in order to select a national champion at the
end of the season.31 While each poll strives to name the team they deem most
deserving of the national championship, there have been several occasions where
the polling system has failed to name a unanimous champion, or even a consensus
champion.32 As college football gained more notoriety and became a billion dollar
business, coaches, universities, and conferences attempted to implement a system
that would streamline the polls and name a consensus national champion on a
yearly basis.33
In addition to the polls naming a champion at the end of the season, college
football has created a bowl system that allows qualifying teams to play one
postseason game. The first bowl game was the 1902 Rose Bowl that was created
to enhance the New Year’s Day festivities surrounding the Tournament of Roses
Parade.34 In the years that have followed, several bowl games have been added to
the yearly schedule with the current number totaling thirty four.35 The expansion
of the bowl system has come as a direct result of university and college presidents,
conference commissioners, and the fans’ desire to see their teams play an extra
game, as well as the financial and recruiting incentives that come to those teams

29
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, supra note 18. Additionally, the Brigham Young University
(“BYU”) Cougars will forego a conference and strike out as an independent beginning in 2011. See
Katz, supra note 24. Unlike Notre Dame, BYU will not be afforded the same considerations within the
BCS system as Notre Dame, at least initially. Id.
30
See Kober supra note 12, at 59.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
Tournament of Roses, Rose Bowl Game History, http://www.tournamentofroses.com/history/
gamehistory.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). The University of Michigan Wolverines defeated Stanford
University 49-0 and caused the Tournament of Roses Parade organizers to drop the football game in
favor of chariot races until 1916 when the bowl game resumed. Id.
35
ESPN, 2009 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Football Schedule – Bowl Week, http://espn.go.
com/college-football/ schedule (last visited Jan 7, 2010) [hereinafter Bowl Schedule].
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that participate.36 Additionally, the number of host cities for the bowl games have
increased as those cities have found the exposure and financial incentives to be
similarly rewarding.37
While the bowl system developed, some of the games became associated
with certain conferences.38 As these bowl affiliations became formalized through
contract, the postseason match-ups became predictable and it became difficult to
manipulate the bowl games in order to create a de facto national championship. 39
While these arrangements provided exciting capstones to the season, they hindered
the process of determining the two best teams. 40 In effect, the arrangements
limited the participation in each of the major bowl games such that certain
conference champions were committed to attending certain bowls while others
were wholly excluded; the net result was a system which was ill suited to match
the two best teams in a national championship game. 41
Due to the inconsistency of the polls and an inability to match the two best
teams on the football field, certain conferences allied themselves to create the
Bowl Coalition in 1992,42 a precursor to the BCS. The system organized the Big
East, ACC, Southwest Conference, Big Eight Conference, the SEC, and Notre
Dame into a coalition that would attempt to create a national championship
game.43

36
Brad Humphreys, More on Economic Impact of Bowl Games, THE SPORTS ECONOMIST, Dec. 22,
2009, http://thesportseconomist.com/labels/economic%20impact.htm. While the economic recession
has caused some teams to actually lose money by attending some of the smaller bowl games, teams are
just as eager to participate because of the exposure playing on national television brings to their
programs. Additionally, the BCS games (the Rose Bowl, Fiesta Bowl, Sugar Bowl, Orange Bowl, and
BCS Championship game) guarantee $18 million payouts to its participants. Id. That money is split
between the university playing in the game and the other universities and colleges within that team’s
conference. Id.
37
See Orlando Bowl Games: $80M Economic Impact, ORLANDO BUS. J., Dec. 28, 2009, http://
orlando.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/2009/12/28/daily2.html; see also Gaylord Hotels Music City
Bowl, Nashville’s Holiday Tradition, http://www.musiccitybowl.com/about_us/history.php (last visited
Jan. 7, 2010); PAC. LIFE HOLIDAY BOWL, Local Bowl Games Have Record Economic Impact for
Region, May 14, 2009, http://www.holidaybowl.com/2009/local-bowl-games-have-record-economicimpact-for-region.html. In addition to the number of cities hosting bowl games, several cities have
begun hosting multiple bowl games each season. See Bowl Schedule, supra note 35.
38
See Kober, supra note 12, at 60.
39
In particular, the Rose Bowl began selecting only the champion from the Big 10 Conference to
match-up against the winner of the Pac 10 Conference, the Orange Bowl selected the champion of the
Big Eight Conference annually, the Sugar Bowl selected the champion of the SEC, and the Cotton Bowl
selected the champion of the Southwest Conference. See Tournament of Roses, supra note 34; see BCS
Chronology, supra note 15.
40
See Kober, supra note 12, at 60.
41
See id.
42
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
43
See id. The system would allow the Southwest, Big Eight, and SEC to retain their traditional
bowl tie-ins while the ACC, Big East, and Notre Dame would travel to the individual bowl games to
play the champion of each of those conferences if the match-up would feature the number one and two
teams in the country. Id. Additionally, if one and two came solely from the Big East, ACC, or Notre
Dame, those two teams would meet in the Fiesta Bowl in Tempe, Arizona. Id. Further, the slots that
were vacated by teams switching bowls would be filled in by at large teams. The Southwest
Conference was considered a major football conference at the time as it was the home to the Texas
Longhorns as well as several other prominent football programs. Blair Kerkhoff, Big 12 Problems
Trace to League’s Roots, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 5, 2010, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/
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While the Bowl Coalition was much more successful than the previous
system,44 there were still limitations.45 For instance, the Bowl Coalition did not
include the Pac 10 and the Big 10.46 This created a situation where the Bowl
Coalition could not match a team with a representative from those conferences; if a
team from the Pac 10 or the Big 10 were in the top two, there could not be a
national championship game that season.47 According to the terms of the contract
governing the Bowl Coalition, the arrangement was to be reviewed every three
years.48 After the 1994 season, the conference commissioners determined it was in
the best interest of college football to create a new system since the contracts
between certain conferences and bowl games expired.49 The net result was the
Bowl Alliance.50
The biggest difference between the Bowl Alliance and the Bowl Coalition
was that the Bowl Alliance eliminated the traditional bowl tie-ins.51 The Bowl
Alliance created a system where the ACC, Big East, Big Eight, Southwest, and
SEC would send their champions to either the Sugar, Fiesta or Orange Bowl with
the hosting bowl committees choosing their own match-ups.52 The system
attempted to “provide the best opportunity to match the top two teams and provide
the greatest flexibility in creating the postseason match-ups between Alliance
partners.”53 Because none of the conference champions were committed to play in
any specific game, the system was much more flexible and allowed for a greater
number of match-ups that resulted in national championship games. 54 Despite
matching up the only two unbeaten teams in the nation in the 1996 Fiesta Bowl,
the Bowl Alliance still failed to include both the Pac 10 and the Big 10.55 Just as
happened three years earlier with the Bowl Coalition, the Bowl Alliance was
jettisoned after the 1997 regular season. 56

sharedcontent/dws/spt/colleges/topstories/stories/060610dnspobig12sider2.112db5e.html. When the
Big Eight expanded to twelve teams and became the Big 12, the conference disbanded. See id.
44
In the first season of the Bowl Coalition, it matched No. 1 Miami and No. 2 Alabama in the
Sugar Bowl in a national championship game. See Kober, supra note 12, at 60.
45
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See Kober, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , Official 2003 Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Football Records, http://www.NCAA.org/library/records_football_records_
book/2003/2003_football_records_ book.pdf).
54
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
55
See id. Nebraska beat Florida in the championship game, 62-24. Fiesta Bowl, Game History,
http://www.fiestabowl.org/index.php/tostitos/history/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
56
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
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The Implementation of the Bowl Championship Series

In 1997, the Bowl Championship Series was created, 57 and in 1998, the BCS
was first used in order to create a national championship game between the first
and second ranked teams.58 The new system addressed the largest problem with
the Bowl Coalition and Bowl Alliance as it included both the Pac 10 and the Big
10 while still assuring them participation in the Rose Bowl if their conference
champions were not chosen for the national championship game.59 Furthermore, it
reintroduced the conference tie-ins that had dominated the pre-Bowl Coalition
period.60 The compromise was made possible when each bowl and the
conferences agreed to rotate the BCS National Championship Game amongst the
four bowls and to supplement the other bowls with competitive match-ups.61
In order to determine which teams should be selected for the BCS National
Championship Game, the BCS agreement created its own standings. 62 The
original standings consisted of four parts: 1) the subjective polls of sportswriters
and coaches, 2) the average of three computer rankings (Sagarin, Seattle Times,
and New York Times), 3) the teams’ records, and 4) the teams’ strength of
schedule index.63 Unlike the sportswriters and coaches polls, the BCS Standings
were not released every week; instead, the BCS Standings were not made public
until the midpoint of the regular season. 64 It was under this format that the
University of Tennessee Volunteers won the first BCS Championship as it
defeated the Florida State University Seminoles in the Fiesta Bowl. 65
In the years since the first BCS Championship Game, the BCS Committee
has made several significant changes to the original agreement in an attempt to
make the series more competitive, increase revenue, and increase the number of

57
M. Todd Carroll, No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl Championship Series Stays In-Bounds
of the Sherman Act, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1235, 1264 (2004). The two primary groups of parties to
the agreement were six conferences (ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 10, and SEC) and four bowl
games (Rose Bowl, Fiesta Bowl, Sugar Bowl, and the Orange Bowl). See id. at 1264 n.171.
58
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
59
See id. Thus, the ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 10, and the SEC were guaranteed at least
one spot in one of the four BCS bowl games each season. Id. Furthermore, the University of Notre
Dame would be guaranteed a spot in one of the games if it finished within the top ten of the final BCS
Standings or had at least nine wins. Id.
60
See id. The Big 12 champion would play in the Fiesta Bowl, the SEC champion would play in
the Sugar Bowl, and either the ACC or Big East champion would play in the Orange Bowl. Id.
61
See id. Each year, one bowl would be designated as the BCS Championship Game. Id. The
teams that would be chosen as the first and second rated teams would forego their traditional bowl tieins and go to the BCS Championship Game. Id. The bowls that would lose their traditional conference
champions would then choose at large teams (or the teams displaced from their traditional games
because their traditional tie-in was hosting the BCS Championship Game) to replace the first or second
rated teams. Id. The teams that would be eligible as at large choices are determined by the BCS
standings and need to meet a strict set of criteria. Id.; see BCS Chronology, supra note 15 (identifying
the exact criteria).
62
See id.
63
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
64
See id.
65
Cable News Network Sports Illustrated (“CNNSI”), Vols Reach Rocky Top, Jan. 9, 1999, http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/college/1998/bowls/fiesta/news/1999/01/04/fiesta_bowl/.
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non-BCS participants.66 The single biggest change to the BCS system occurred in
2004, when the BCS Committee agreed to add a fifth game to the Series. 67 In
2003, Scott Cowen, President of Tulane University, formed the Presidential
Coalition for Athletics Reform in order to use antitrust law to bring equality and
fairness to the BCS System.68 Cowen and his coalition were able to convince
Congress to listen to his demands and the ensuing publicity compelled the BCS to
modify its structure.69 Instead of requiring one of the bowls to host the BCS
National Championship Game in lieu of its traditional game, the new system
created a game independent of the traditional bowl game that would be played a
week later than the traditional bowl game at the same location.70 By adding an
additional game to the Series without adding any additional conference champion
guarantees, the BCS added two additional at large bids for each season.71
To supplement this change, the BCS addressed the rules for the inclusion of
at large teams both from the conferences with a guaranteed BCS game and those
from outside the guaranteed six.72 Starting with the 2006 season, a conference
champion from one of the non-guaranteed conferences would earn an automatic
berth if it was ranked in the top twelve of the BCS Standings or ranked in the top
sixteen of the BCS Standings and its ranking was higher than that of a champion of
one of the automatic-qualifying conferences.73 Further, the committee determined
that if more than one team from a non-automatic-qualifying conference won its
conference and finished within the top twelve, only the highest ranked team would
be guaranteed a place in one of the BCS games. 74 In addition to adding a fifth
game to the BCS, the BCS Committee has altered its ranking formula several times
since its inception in 1998.75 Despite the alterations, the BCS Standings still strive

66

See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
See id.
68
Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl Championship
Series Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14 SPORTS L. J. 219, 234 (2007). In 1998, Tulane
finished the regular season undefeated while winning ten games by a double-digit margin. Id. at 23233. Despite their impressive record, their BCS ranking was not high enough to secure a spot in the BCS
Championship Game. Id.
69
See id. at 234.
70
See id. For instance, for the 2009 season, the Rose Bowl Committee hosted the Rose Bowl
game on New Year’s Day 2010 and then hosted the BCS Championship Game on Jan. 7, 2010. Thayer
Evans, Buckeyes Win Some Respect at the Rose Bowl, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at D4; Pete Thamel,
Alabama returns to the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at B7.
71
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
72
See id.
73
See id. The University of Notre Dame would also earn an automatic berth if it finished the
regular season within the top eight of the BCS Standings. Id.
74
See id.
75
See id. Under the current formula, there are three components to the BCS Standings with each
component counting as 1/3 of the BCS formula. College Football Poll, BCS Explained, http://
www.collegefootballpoll.com/bcs_explained.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). The first component is the
Harris Interactive Poll, which replaced the Associated Press Poll. Id. The second component is the
USA Today Coaches Poll. Id. The third component is the average of six computer rankings to provide
an objective component. Id. The six computer rankings are the Peter Wolfe Ranking, the Wes Colley
Ranking, the Sagarin Ranking, the Seattle Times Ranking, the Richard Billingsley Ranking, and the
Kenneth Massey Ranking. Id. Both the top computer ranking for each team as well as the lowest
computer ranking for each team are excluded and an average is taken for the remaining four rankings.
67
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to place the top two teams in the BCS National Championship Game.
III. THE ISSUE
Former Michigan State University football coach Duffy Daugherty once said
that “[w]hen you are playing for the national championship, it’s not a matter of life
or death. It’s more important than that.”76 While Daugherty maintained a jovial
relationship with the media,77 his quip about the seriousness of college football has
been proven time and time again. The level of passion that fans of college football
maintain is unparalleled in the United States. Between alumni, state sponsored
universities, amateur athletes, pep rallies, tailgating, and 100,000 seat stadiums,
college football holds a unique spot in the American sports landscape, and as such,
it is subjected to strict scrutiny when an injustice appears.
While Daugherty and his teams never dealt with the BCS, the
implementation of the Series has taken this level of scrutiny to a new level. The
BCS maintains that it is an “arrangement for post-season college football that is
designed to match the two top-rated teams in a national championship game.”78
Because the BCS is almost solely concerned with pairing only two teams in a
winner take all game, all but two universities are excluded from competing for the
national championship at the close of the regular season. Effectively, the BCS
eliminates the possibility of a national championship to all but two teams on the
last day of the regular season, before the final bowl games are played, regardless of
the team’s record.
In the past few years, ardent college football fans have become disillusioned
with the BCS as the system has barred seemingly deserving teams from the
opportunity to compete for the national championship. Some of the most
outspoken critics of the BCS have been politicians. In addition to President
Obama decrying the BCS and presenting a plan for a playoff, several members of
Capitol Hill have expressed outrage towards the BCS. In hopes of curing the ills
that they see, legislators have proposed different bills that would address some of
the major flaws of the BCS system.
While fans, members of the media, and politicians call for a change to the
BCS system, the NCAA, its member institutions, and the Division I FBS
conferences have resisted major substantive changes to the arrangement. Starting
in 1976, various proposals for a championship playoff have been presented and
studied by various committees.79 Shortly after being proposed, these plans have
Id.
76
Quoteland, Duffy Daugherty, http://www.quoteland.com/topic.asp?CATEGORY_ID=211 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2010). Daugherty was the head coach at Michigan State University for nineteen seasons
between 1954 and 1972. Shav Glick, At Michigan State, the Spirit of Duffy Still Moves Team, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1987, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1987-12-29/sports/sp-31975_1_michiganstate. Daugherty was an assistant coach on the 1951 and 1952 national championship teams and the
head coach on the 1955, 1957, 1965, and 1966 teams. 2006 Michigan State University Spartans
Football Media Guide, http://graphics.fansonly.com/photos/schools/msu/sports/m-footbl/auto_pdf/06mg-section3.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
77
See Glick, supra note 76.
78
BCS, The BCS Is…, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/definition (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
79
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Postseason College Football FAQs, http://www.
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either been rejected or withdrawn.80 In 1988, a resolution was presented at the
annual NCAA Convention which stated the Division IA membership did not
support the creation of a playoff system in order to determine a national
championship.81 The vote passed with ninety eight votes in favor and thirteen
opposed.82 Additionally, in 1994, a blue ribbon panel was formed in order to
gather information about the viability of establishing an NCAA sponsored football
championship.83 The report was forwarded to the NCAA Presidents Commission
which subsequently stated that the NCAA would not pursue a football
championship.84 Currently, football is the only sport administered by the NCAA
that does not have a playoff to determine an official national champion, and it
appears that the NCAA and the majority of the member institutions are content
with the current system.85 It was under these set of circumstances that the Bowl
Coalition, Bowl Alliance, and Bowl Championship Series were formed.86
As teams from non-automatic qualifying conferences have gotten more
competitive and teams from automatic qualifying conferences have retained their
overall level of play, more teams are beginning to finish the regular season either
undefeated or with only one loss. 87 Several teams, and more importantly, their
fans, have felt as if they have been victimized by a system that does not determine
a champion on the field, but rather by computers and sportswriters that cannot
possibly watch every team play every game. While the teams and fans of schools
left out of the BCS Championship Game lose out on the ability to play in the
national championship game, they also lose other ancillary benefits. 88 One of the
biggest losses is that the rejected institutions receive less prize money which,
“affects scholarships, booster donations, compliance with NCAA requirements,
recruiting abilities” and more.89 It is because of these negative effects to several
teams that changes have been proposed in Congress and that the eradication of the
BCS will continue to be a pet project of several prominent lawmakers.

NCAA.org/wps/NCAA?ContentID=2222 (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Postseason FAQs].
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
Postseason FAQs, supra note 79.
85
See Nixon, supra note 5, at 367.
86
See supra Part II.C. and accompanying notes 42-65.
87
In the 2009 regular season alone, the University of Alabama Crimson Tide, the University of
Texas Longhorns, the University of Cincinnati Bearcats, the Texas Christian University Horned Frogs,
and the Boise State University Broncos all finished the regular season undefeated. ESPN, 2009 College
Football Rankings – Week 15 (Dec. 6), http://espn.go.com/college-football/rankings/_/week/15. Out of
those five, Alabama and Texas met in the BCS Championship Game. See Thamel, supra note 70.
After each team’s bowl game, both Alabama and Boise State remained undefeated. ESPN, 2009
College Football Rankings – Postseason, http://espn.go.com/college-football/rankings/_/week/1/
seasontype/3.
88
See Nixon, supra note 5, at 368.
89
See id.
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IV. BCS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
A. The NCAA, Sherman, and the Run to the BCS
When the Sherman Antitrust Act90 was first enacted, the goal was to “protect
and promote a competitive market in the United States.”91 The method to achieve
these goals was through eliminating cartels, monopolies, and illegal business
practices that restrain trade.92 Restraints of trade exist when parties prevent the
market from operating freely through subverting competition.93 Through Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the Sherman Antitrust Act has been interpreted to prohibit
only “unreasonable restraints” of trade.94 Because of the “unreasonable restraints”
language, it is possible for restraints of trade that may subvert competition to exist
without being unreasonable. Sports in general have been generally found to exist
under a series of reasonable restraints.
Sports have a unique place in the fabric of antitrust law because the market
and structure of sporting events is one where regulation and organization under a
sole governing body actually creates a more competitive market than if teams,
organizations, and leagues all operated under separate systems. 95 It is with these
considerations in mind that professional sports have largely been free of regulation,
despite their obvious monopolistic tendencies.96 The NCAA, on the other hand,
has recently seen an increase in antitrust consideration.
Beginning in the late 1970s, the court system began applying the Sherman
Antitrust Act to the NCAA.97 Because the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in

90

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $ 1,000,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Id.
91
Katherine McClelland, Comment, Should College Football’s Currency Read “In BCS We Trust”
or Is It Just Monopoly Money?: Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Championship Series, 37 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 167, 191 (2004).
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See Jason R. Corns, Comment, Pigskin Paydirt: The Thriving of College Football’s Bowl
Championship Series in the Face of Antitrust Law, 39 TULSA L. REV. 167, 182-83 (2003) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911)).
95
See id.
96
See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922); William S. Robbins, Comment, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption – A Corked Bat
for Owners, 55 LA. L. REV. 937, 939-40 (1995); Joseph Covelli, Note, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: At
the Intersection of Antitrust and Labor Law, Supreme Court’s Decision Gives Management the Green
Light, 27 STETSON L. REV. 257, 264-76 (1997); Dan Messeloff, Note, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil:
The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 521, 539-41 (2000).
97
See Schmit, supra note 68, at 236.
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order to regulate trusts and other economic arrangements, the NCAA relied upon
its status as the promoter and organizer of amateur sports to remain immune from
close scrutiny.98 Because the NCAA is “designed to initiate, stimulate and
improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote and
develop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics
participation as a recreational pursuit within amateur intercollegiate athletics,” the
NCAA had been able to circumvent most antitrust actions. 99 However, as Division
I basketball and football have grown economically, in popularity, and in national
visibility, the NCAA has come under closer scrutiny through the Sherman
Antitrust Act, with particular attention being paid to matters of revenue, as the
method for finding violations. 100
The first major case stating that the NCAA was subject to federal antitrust
law was Hennessey v. NCAA.101 In 1977, two University of Alabama assistant
coaches brought suit against the NCAA. 102 The two coaches protested an NCAA
bylaw that restricted the number of assistant coaches a football and basketball
program could keep on staff at one time. 103 While the court said that the NCAA
could keep the rule, the Fifth Circuit court recognized that the NCAA was subject
to federal antitrust laws.104 The court acknowledged that the purpose of the bylaw
was to encourage collegiate athletic competition as well as to ensure that college
football and basketball programs were enhancing the educational process. 105
The second major antitrust case involving the NCAA was NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma.106 The University of Oklahoma and the
University of Georgia brought suit against the NCAA in order to challenge the
NCAA wide plan for televising college football games. 107 According to the plan,
the NCAA agreed to a deal with the television networks ABC and CBS whereby
each network could carry fourteen live “exposures” throughout the college football
season and would do so for a minimum aggregate compensation. 108 In short, the
agreement authorized each network to negotiate with member institutions for the

98
See id. See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of
Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 667-95 (1993) (giving historical information about
the Sherman Antitrust Act).
99
See McClelland, supra note 94, at 170 (quoting 2004-2005 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
Division I Manual, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N
Const. art. 1.2(a) (2004),
http:www.NCAA.org/library/membership/divisionimanual/2004-05d1manual. pdf) (internal marks
omitted).
100
See Corns, supra note 94, at 179.
101
See id.
102
Hennessey v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1977).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1149. The court stated that the National Collegiate Athletic Association was subject to
the Rule of Reason analysis as it weighed the anticompetitive effects of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s act against its procompetitive effects in order to determine whether there was an
unreasonable restraint. See Corns, supra note 94, at 179. The Rule of Reason analysis is one test that
the courts use in order to determine whether or not there is an antitrust violation. See infra Part IV.B.
105
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1153.
106
See Corns, supra note 94, at 179-80.
107
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
108
Id. at 92-93.
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right to broadcast their games.109
While the agreements with the network did not set a method for computing
the fees, the NCAA did recommend certain fees, with national telecasts being the
most valuable, followed by regional telecasts, and then Division II or III games. 110
Other than the different fees for national telecasts and regional telecasts, the
amount that teams received did not change based on audience size, the number of
markets that the game was broadcast in, or the particular characteristics of the
teams.111 Furthermore, the plan dictated that the networks must show a minimum
number of teams over a two year period and that no member institution may appear
more than a total of six times over a two year period. 112 The Court determined that
“the plan limits the total amount of televised intercollegiate football and the
number of games that any one team may televise” while it prevented the member
institutions from selling television rights for games outside of the basic plan. 113
Accordingly, the Court held that the television deal violated federal antitrust
law.114
In 1988, the NCAA was brought back into court in Law v. NCAA.115 Law
alleged that the NCAA violated federal antitrust law by enforcing a rule that
restricted the level of coaches’ compensation for entry-level coaches.116 The
NCAA argued that the restriction would help level an uneven playing field among
its member institutions.117

109

Id. at 93.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 120. The Court again used Rule of Reason analysis in order to determine that there was a
federal antitrust violation. See id. The Court found that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
plan of effectively setting the price of television rights as well as limiting the number of games
broadcasted created a horizontal restraint in trade which resulted in more anticompetitive effects than
procompetitive effects for college football programs all while prohibiting those programs from
negotiating their own television deals for those games otherwise not televised. See Corns, supra note
94, at 180 The National Collegiate Athletic Association attempted to justify the plan by stating that the
plan “intended to reduce . . . the adverse effects of live television upon football game attendance and, in
turn, upon the athletic and education programs dependent upon that football attendance.” Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 91. Later cases suggested that a new test, the quick-look Rule of Reason test
would have been more prescient as it would easily skip the lengthy, fact detailed analysis necessary for
the Rule of Reason test, because a simple economic analysis would show that the limitation of
television exposure (output) and the setting of a fixed minimum price would have an extreme
anticompetitive effect on the market. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). Similar
arguments were made by the National Football League (“NFL”) in light of antitrust legislation. See
Lacie L. Kaiser, Comment, Revisiting the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A Call for Equitable
Antitrust Immunity From Section One of the Sherman Act for all Professional Sports Leagues, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 1237 (2005). In response to potential litigation, the National Football League
convinced Congress to pass the Sports Broadcasting Act which stated that “antitrust laws . . . shall not
apply to any joint agreement . . . by which any league [] participating in professional football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s
member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such clubs.”
Id. at 1245 (quoting Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. 1291 (2006)).
115
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
116
Id. at 1012.
117
Id. at 1024.
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The court held that the restriction did constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade and that the NCAA did not meet the burden of showing that the
procompetitive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects.118 The NCAA put
forth three justifications for the rule that were all rejected by the Tenth Circuit. 119
First, the NCAA stated that by restricting one of the coaching positions to an entrylevel position would create more balance by keeping wealthier teams from hiring a
more experienced coach.120 The Tenth Circuit held that the NCAA failed to
produce evidence that the rules would be effective over time. 121 Second, the
NCAA posited that the bylaw would help member institutions cut cost.122 The
Tenth Circuit rejected this justification in a similar vein as it stated that there was
no evidence that the bylaw would reduce the deficits reported by member
institutions as they could simply use the saved money elsewhere. 123 Finally, the
NCAA stated that the bylaw would help “maintain competitive equity” among
member institutions by preventing the wealthier and more profitable teams from
installing a higher-priced coach in the entry-level position.124 The Tenth Circuit
rejected the NCAA’s reasoning by holding that the NCAA offered no proof that
“salary restrictions enhance competition [or] level an uneven playing field.”125
Since the NCAA could not provide any evidence that the procompetitive effects
outweighed the anticompetitive effects, the Tenth Circuit held that the NCAA
bylaw violated federal antitrust law.126
The common tie between these three cases is commerce. The courts have
been willing to hold the NCAA accountable for federal antitrust violations when
the opposing party has been able to show that the NCAA has instituted rules or
regulations that restrict, hinder, or impact commercial matters of its member
institutions and employees. The courts recognize the specific role of the NCAA to
organize and administer amateur athletics designed to enhance the academic
experience of its participants, but it also recognizes that the NCAA has become big
business. Accordingly, when the NCAA has regulated universities or colleges in
non-commercial matters, such as participant eligibility, competition conditions,
standards of amateurism, and other essentials to the game, courts have found the
actions to fall outside of federal antitrust law. 127 However, when the NCAA
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Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1019, 1021.
120
Law, 134 F.3d at 1022.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1023.
124
Id. at 1024.
125
Law, 134 F.3d at 1024.
126
See Schmit, supra note 68, at 239-40. The court again used the Rule of Reason analysis to
determine that the National Collegiate Athletic Association could not show that the procompetitive
effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects. Law, 134 F.3d at 1024.
127
See Corns, supra note 94, at 180 n.120 (citing Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139
F.3d 180, 185-86 (3rd Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999); Banks v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 997 F.2d 1081, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1992); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287 (D. Kan. 1999); Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d
460, 497 (D.N.J. 1998); Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 738, 745 (M.D. Tenn.
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attempts to regulate commercial matters, such as television contracts, employee
salaries, and the number of jobs a school can offer, it is subject to federal antitrust
law.
B. The BCS and Whether or Not it is a Violation of Sherman Antitrust Act
While it is clear that the NCAA is subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
validity of the BCS in terms of antitrust jurisprudence has not yet been subject to
judicial scrutiny. The following section takes a deeper look into antitrust law and
attempts to determine whether or not the BCS does violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act.
1.Sherman Antitrust Analysis
The Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”128 The goal of
the Sherman Antitrust Act was to prohibit only those actions which constitute an
unreasonable restraint on trade, rather than create a bright line rule barring all
restraints on trade.129 Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared that the analysis
of antitrust violations “cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it
restrains competition.”130
One of the first Sherman Act cases was Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v. United States, in which the Supreme Court was asked to analyze
whether or not the Board could continue implementing the “Call” rule despite the
arrangement restricting commerce.131 The Board adopted the “Call” rule in order
to restrict purchasing grain after a certain point in the day in order to keep the
market steady.132 In its decision, the Court rejected the assertion that all restraints
on trade violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 133 The court examined the nature,
scope, and the actual affects of the rule and found that the “Call” rule better served
to improve market conditions as it allowed for an increase in output, brought
buyers and sellers together to facilitate commerce, distributed the grain to a greater
number of people, and eliminated the risks of buying and selling grain on the
private market.134 The Court reasoned that every board of trade has rules and
regulations that are designed to facilitate business by its members and that if these
rules of practicality were eliminated by the Sherman Antitrust Act, commerce
would be adversely harmed.135 By stating that the rules of the Board were
1990); (ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A
STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 15 (U. Chi. Press 1992)).
128
Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 90.
129
Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918).
130
Id. at 238.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 239.
133
Id. at 241.
134
Id. at 240.
135
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 241.
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necessary in order to further the commercial interests, the Court laid the
groundwork for a line of reasoning that allowed for procompetitive justifications to
trump the desire for a free and open market. 136
In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to develop antitrust law in order
to provide lower courts and corporations with guidelines for dealing with antitrust
issues.137 The Court has indicated that there are several instances where
restrictions are not unreasonable when the procompetitive effects outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.138 Accordingly, the Court has clearly identified three tests
to be used in analyzing whether or not there is a restraint on competition that
violates the Sherman Antitrust Act.139
The first of these tests is the Per Se Rule. The Per Se Rule has been applied
in situations where, facially, the restraints imposed by the practice are
unreasonable.140 As a matter of law, certain forms of restraint are considered per
se violations as they “almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output.”141 Furthermore, if the evidence shows that a significant restraint on trade
causes a detrimental effect on competition, a court can end its analysis and label
the restraint a violation of antitrust law. 142 Examples of per se violations include
horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, output limitation, and group boycotts. 143
Originally, courts consistently ruled group boycotts as per se violations of
antitrust law.144 These boycotts were defined as “concerted refusals by traders to
deal with other traders.”145 Further, the courts stated that group boycotts could not
be “saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific
circumstances.”146 While this bright line rule made analysis easy, the courts found
it untenable and began amending their analyses.147
In modern antitrust
jurisprudence, group boycotts are subjected to the more flexible Rule of Reason. 148
The second test is the Rule of Reason Test. The first Supreme Court case
involving the Rule of Reason Test was Standard Oil Co. v. United States.149 In
Standard Oil, the Supreme Court ruled that Standard Oil formed an illegal trust,
and in conjunction with its subsidiary holdings, formed a monopoly in order to
restrain commerce in the petroleum industry. 150 In order to remedy the problem,
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See Kober, supra note 12, at 64.
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See McClelland, supra note 91, at 193-94.
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See Kober, supra note 12, at 65.
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See McClelland, supra note 91, at 194.
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the Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling of enjoining Standard Oil and the
subsidiary companies from conducting interstate commerce in the petroleum
industry while Standard Oil still had ownership in those subsidiaries. 151 In its
decision, the Court expanded on the narrow language of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and incorporated the Rule of Reason Test in order to determine whether Standard
Oil had violated the Act.152 The Court determined that Standard Oil went beyond
the limitations of the Rule of Reason Test and that their contracts with the
subsidiaries placed an unreasonable restraint on trade.153
In the years since Standard Oil, the Rule of Reason Test has been refined.
The Test requires the fact-finder to weigh “all of the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint of competition.”154 In Board of Trade, the Court laid out
the most oft cited statement for the Rule of Reason Test:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.155

Furthermore, the Rule of Reason Test shifts the burden to the party accused
of the antitrust violation if the charging party can show either actual
anticompetitive effects or “proof of the market power possessed by the parties in
agreement.”156 In order to defeat this burden, the party accused of the antitrust
violation can proffer evidence of its procompetitive intent by showing how the
arrangement benefits competition rather than inhibits it. 157 If the party being
charged can defeat the burden, the burden is once again shifted back to the party
alleging the antitrust violation. That party must then show that the current
arrangement is unreasonable and that a less restrictive alternative exists.158
Through the course of its antitrust jurisprudence, the Court has applied both
the Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason. However, several cases have arisen that
do not fit neatly into either test. As such, the court has developed the quick-look
Rule of Reason Test.159 In California Dental Association v. Federal Trade
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 45-46.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 81.
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
Id. at n.15.
See Kober, supra note 12, at 65-66.
See id.
See id. at 66.
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 769-70.
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Commission, the Federal Trade Commission charged the California Dental
Association with implementing guidelines that in effect “restrict truthful,
nondeceptive advertising.”160 The Federal Trade Commission alleged that this
violated antitrust law.161 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
approved the use of the Federal Trade Commission’s use of the quick-look Rule of
Reason test.162
In its decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the quick-look Rule of Reason
Test and clarified when it should be used.163 First, the Court held that a “naked
restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis”164 but “no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of horizontal agreements
among competitors to refuse to discuss prices, or to withhold a particular desired
service.”165 Second, the Court held that the Test should be used when “an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
markets.166
As construed, the party charged with violating antitrust laws must proffer
evidence that there are procompetitive justifications for the restraint.167 If the party
cannot meet this burden, the analysis is ended and the agreement is rendered
invalid.168 If the party charged does meet its burden, then the court must conduct a
full Rule of Reason analysis.169
2.Identifying the Conduct of the BCS that is Being Challenged
As described in Part II.C.2., the BCS is a contractual agreement between the
six major conferences of college football and four major bowl games. 170 Both of
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Id. at 761.
Id. (stating that the violation falls under the Federal Trade Commission Act’s prohibition of
unfair competition and deceptive acts or practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), this Act overlaps the scope of
the Sherman Antitrust Act). The Federal Trade Commission Act makes it illegal to engage in “unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices or practices
in or affecting commerce.” Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
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Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763-64. The court of appeals based its ruling on language from
the Board of Regents case when it stated “that the Commission had properly applied an abbreviated, or
‘quick look,’ rule of reason analysis designed for restraints that are not per se unlawful but are
sufficiently anticompetitive on their face that they do not require a full-blown rule of reason inquiry.”
Id. at 763 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109-10) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163
Id. at 769-70.
164
Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109).
165
Id. at 770 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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See Kober, supra note 12, at 66.
168
See id.
169
See id.
170
See supra Part II.C.2 (describing the implementation of the BCS). The BCS agreement also
contains an agreement with the American Broadcasting System for exclusive rights to the Rose Bowl
game. See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1264 n.171. That portion of the agreement is of little importance
to the analysis since the arrangement is vertically related to the BCS. See id. Vertical arrangements do
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these groups play an instrumental part in the execution of the college football
postseason: the conferences produce conference champion teams as an output and
the bowl games produce the games and offer a good to the consumer. 171 The
stated goal of the BCS is to combine the efforts of the conferences and the bowl
games to produce both a national champion and more competitive, higher quality
bowl games.172 Furthermore, the BCS contains aspects of a horizontal agreement
since it involves the six conferences agreeing to subject their champions to the
BCS agreement while the bowl games traditionally compete to bring the best teams
in order to have compelling match-ups each season.173 In short, the bowls have
traditionally competed against each other to bring in the best teams, but by
agreeing to distribute them in an organized manner, they have subverted the free
market.
While there is certainly a horizontal agreement, the BCS operates on the
level of a vertical agreement as well.174 The vertical agreement is manifested in
the relationship between the producers (the conferences) and the good to be sold
(the bowl games).175 This vertical arrangement is important as courts emphasize
the type of arrangement in determining which level of scrutiny to apply to the
case.176 Through its antitrust jurisprudence, the courts have shown that horizontal
conduct limiting competition has a greater likelihood of being treated as a per se
violation; vertical agreements are most likely to be analyzed under the Rule of
Reason.177 Since the BCS contains both horizontal and vertical elements, the total
agreement will be analyzed under each of the three tests.
3.The BCS and the Per Se Rule
Per se review would be inappropriate in a BCS antitrust case. As stated in
Part IV.B.1., per se analysis is only applicable when “the practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.”178 Despite the clarity of the statement, courts have been hesitant
in applying the Per Se Rule, especially when there are significant procompetitive
justifications for entering into potentially restraining agreements. 179 If the nonBCS schools brought an antitrust case against the BCS, the likelihood of a court

not warrant per se termination. See id. (citing U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,
594 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] purely vertical arrangement, by which . . . a supplier or dealer makes an
agreement exclusively to supply or serve a manufacturer, is not a group boycott.”)).
171
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1264.
172
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
173
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1264.
174
See id. at 1265.
175
See id.
176
See id (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982)
(“[H]orizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints.”)); U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
986 F.2d at 594 (noting that vertical restraints are not condemned as per se violations of §1 of the
Sherman Act because the incentives for such agreements are usually “benign” towards the competitive
process, among other reasons).
177
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1265.
178
See supra Part IV.B.1; Broad: Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19-20.
179
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1267.
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not hearing the procompetitive justifications in light of the Rule of Reason Test is
minimal. If, however, the court did examine the validity of an antitrust suit under
the Per Se Rule, it most likely would do so under the guise of the group boycott
test.180
Under the group boycott test, the BCS would not constitute a per se violation
regardless of whether there is a boycott or not. With the BCS, there are several
procompetitive justifications that prevent the court from drawing a “confident
conclusion about the agreement’s anticompetitive effects.”181 Some of these
procompetitive justifications include the dual aims of creating a national
championship game, competitive BCS bowl games, and to generate interest
amongst fans.182 Because there are procompetitive justifications, the trial court
would be required to conduct further analysis. This conclusion is further bolstered
by the result in Board of Regents.183 In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
found that horizontal restraints were necessary in order for the NCAA to organize
intercollegiate athletics.184 This statement by the Court only adds to the notion that
the Per Se Rule would be inapplicable in BCS antitrust litigation.
4.The BCS and the Quick-Look Analysis
Similar to the Per Se Test, the quick-look test attempts to expedite the
examination of the party charged with an antitrust violation. 185 Under the quicklook test, the court considers whether the procompetitive justifications are
significantly outweighed by the anticompetitive effects; if they are significantly
outweighed, the court will rule that there is an antitrust violation. 186 Like in the
case of a per se examination, the procompetitive effects and the anticompetitive
effects here are both numerous. Because the procompetitive justifications could
outweigh the anticompetitive effects, a quick-look analysis would be short sighted
and detrimental to determining whether the spirit of the Sherman Antitrust Act had
been violated.
5.The BCS and the Rule of Reason
The battle over whether the BCS is an antitrust violation is certain to be
determined under the Rule of Reason analysis. Both those in favor of the BCS and
those against the BCS have laid forth several arguments for why the BCS, as
currently structured, may or may not constitute a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. While the original formulation of the BCS was challenged by
Cowen and the Presidential Commission in 2003 and resulted in changes to the
180
See C. Paul Rogers III, The Quest for Number One in College Football: The Revised Bowl
Championship Series, Antitrust and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 285 (2008).
181
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1267. See infra Part IV.B.5.a. (discussing procompetitive
justifications).
182
See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying footnotes 57-58.
183
See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1267.
184
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-03.
185
See Schmit, supra note 68, at 241.
186
See id. at 241-42; see infra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes 161-71.
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Series,187 the current form of the BCS has not yet been addressed in a legal or
legislative sense.
As examined in Part IV.B.1., the Rule of Reason Test weighs the strength of
each parties’ competing arguments against one another.188 The first determination
the court will make is whether the restraint has significant anticompetitive
effects.189 If the court finds that the charging party’s allegation of anticompetitive
effects is met, the court will shift the burden to the party charged with the antitrust
violation.190 Once the burden is shifted, the party charged with the antitrust
violation, the BCS and NCAA in this instance, must show that the procompetitive
justifications enhance competition rather than inhibit it.191 If the party charged can
show that the procompetitive justifications for the restrictions enhance
competition, then the charging party must show that there is at least one less
restrictive alternative in order for the court to determine that there is an antitrust
violation.192 In order to determine whether or not the BCS arrangement can
withstand Rule of Reason analysis, this paper will look first at the anticompetitive
effects of the BCS, to be followed by the procompetitive justifications for the
restraint, and then whether any less restrictive alternatives exist.
a. Anticompetitive Effects of the BCS
In 2003, the United States House of Representatives invited prominent
members of the collegiate athletic world to appear before the House Committee on
the Judiciary (“Committee”) in order to hear debate on aspects of the BCS that
potentially violate antitrust law.193 Throughout the hearing, the Committee
solicited the opinions of then-President of the NCAA Myles Brand, Big 10
Commissioner Jim Delaney, Cowen, and Steve Young, a former collegiate football
player at Brigham Young University. 194 It became apparent, from those opposed
to the BCS, that there were two broad classes of anticompetitive effects that the
arrangement imposes upon those from outside of the six BCS conferences. 195 The
first of the anticompetitive classes is that there have been recruiting barriers
erected between those teams within the six BCS conferences and those teams from
conferences that are not guaranteed a BCS Bowl.196 The second broad argument
proffered by opponents of the BCS states that there has been economic damage
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See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes 69-78.
See Schmit, supra note 68, at 242.
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See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes 151-60.
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See id.
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Competition in College Athletic Conferences and Antitrust Aspects of the Bowl Championship
Series, 10th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensebrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
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See id. at 5. In addition to playing quarterback at Brigham Young, Young led the San Francisco
49ers to three Super Bowl championships, won two NFL Most Valuable Player awards, attained his
Juris Doctor from BYU in 1994, and is an NFL analyst for ESPN. See id.
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See Schmit, supra note 68, at 243.
196
See id.
188

204

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. IV:I

and disparities suffered by those schools outside of the BCS. 197
In his testimony, Cowen stated that he believed that the recruitment of the
most talented high school football player is paramount to establishing a successful
collegiate program.198 While it is hard to quantify this, his statement follows a
logical progression that has been confirmed throughout history. First, the BCS
agreement only affords a practical opportunity to play in the BCS National
Championship Game to two teams from the six BCS conferences. 199 Additionally,
as currently configured, the BCS only offers ten spots total for its five games, with
six of the spots already guaranteed to the six conference champions. 200 That leaves
only four at large births to be divided between the remaining BCS conference
teams and the non-BCS conference teams. While it is possible for these spots to be
filled by non-BCS conference teams, the practical reality is that, at most, two
teams from non-BCS affiliated conferences are able to receive bids to one of the
BCS Bowls, and no teams have a practical opportunity to make the BCS National
Championship Game.201
For coaches, the exposure a team receives from playing in one of these bowl
games is invaluable.202 The BCS Bowl Games are all played during the highly
visible holiday season and are broadcast nationwide. 203 Not only do the teams
featured in the game become highly visible, the conferences that they belong to are
well exposed. 204 Such exposure allows coaches from the BCS conferences to gain
a recruiting advantage as they can use this as leverage against non-BCS schools;
this directly influences the amount of higher talented recruits to choose BCS
affiliated schools over non-BCS affiliated schools.205 While this may not be as
harmful in a one year vacuum, the BCS and recruiting do not operate as a one shot
deal. When the best players choose the best teams and then the best teams get
better, a cycle is created in which the non-BCS schools are continually unable to
recruit the best players.206
In a similar vein, coaches searching for jobs follow the same logic. Coaches,
like players, want to win conference championships, BCS Bowl Games, and
national championships. The only practical way to win a BCS Bowl Game or a
national championship is to do so from within the BCS system. In his testimony,
Cowen argued that the BCS had created artificial barriers that “limit access to bowl
games and championship competition,” such that the non-BCS schools have
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“become virtual training grounds for future BCS coaches.”207
The second argument put forth by the opponents of the BCS is that the BCS
has created an ever widening financial gap between the BCS schools and the nonBCS schools.208 In the first five years of the BCS, the sixty three BCS schools
earned and shared approximately $500 million. During that same time period, the
fifty three non-BCS schools shared a mere $17 million.209 The disparity exists
because of the format of the BCS, the revenue sharing amongst only the
conferences that are represented in the games, and the cycle created when the
teams with money get more and the teams without money continue to be left
behind. Furthermore, this lack of shared revenue has a trickledown effect: the nonBCS schools do not receive as much money which leads to a hindered ability to
upgrade facilities, spend more money on coach and staff personnel, or spend
money on the recruitment of players.210 Additionally, the institutions outside of
the BCS potentially need to reallocate funding from general or academic funds to
pay for athletics.211 Lastly, the BCS schools see both a higher number of
applicants which can make the institution far more selective, with the goal of
becoming a more prestigious academic institution. 212
In response to the testimony of Cowen and his Presidential Coalition of
Athletics Reform, the BCS modified its agreement in an attempt to improve access
for non-BCS schools.213 These responses included adding a fifth BCS Bowl
Game, the BCS Championship Game, changing the automatic-qualifying criteria to
make it more likely that a team from outside the BCS would qualify for a BCS
game, and revising the revenue sharing plan. 214 The changes have had a positive

207
See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 20 (statement of Dr. Scott Cowen). The
most illustrative coach to follow this path has been Urban Meyer at the University of Florida. He has
won two national championships at Florida since leaving the University of Utah. Urban Meyer, Head
Football Coach, http://web.coachurbanmeyer.com/index2.php?page=yes (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
Utah plays in the MWC, which is not a part of the BCS, while Florida plays in the SEC. Id. Since he
arrived at Florida, he has won two national championship games and, following the 2009 regular
season, won the Sugar Bowl as an at large bid. Id. Both of his Florida Gator teams won national
championships even after losing a regular season game en route to their championship. Id. While he
was at Utah, he led the 2004 Utah Utes to the 2005 Fiesta Bowl, which his team won, to cap off an
undefeated season. Id. Despite finishing the season undefeated, the Utes were never considered for the
BCS Championship game. Id. After Meyer left for Florida, Utah received another at large BCS bid
after finishing the 2008 regular season undefeated. See Glier, supra note 3. In that game, the Utes beat
the University of Alabama in the Sugar Bowl, but were never considered for the BCS Championship
game. Id.
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See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 19 (statement of Dr. Scott Cowen).
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See id. at 31 (statement of Steve Young).
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See id. (postulating that money from the general coffers that would normally be “allocated to
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[BCS schools]. In turn, this scenario allows the BCS schools a superior chance at providing all the
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faculty and research.”).
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Matt Egan, Sports Business: BCS Selection Process Spurs Debate, FOXBUSINESS, Dec. 30,
2007, http://www.themarketingarm.com/media/news/139.
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impact on allowing more non-BCS teams to qualify for BCS games, 215 but it has
yet to produce a team to compete in the BCS Championship Game or to bring
economic equality to the non-BCS schools.216 It is apparent that the changes to the
BCS have helped even the playing field between the BCS schools and the nonBCS schools, but the anticompetitive effects still exist.
b. Procompetitive Justifications for the BCS
Since the anticompetitive effects are persistent, under the Rule of Reason
analysis, it is important for the BCS to put forth its arguments as to why the
arrangement actually improves the market of college football. According to the
BCS, the arrangement is designed to create a national championship game between
the top two rated teams, to create exciting and competitive match-ups among eight
other teams, to provide more access to the major bowls, to provide greater
television exposure, and to also produce more postseason revenue than before.217
The single greatest procompetitive justification put forth by the BCS is that it
creates a true national champion. Before the Bowl Coalition and the Bowl
Alliance were formed in the 1990s, there was never a true attempt at matching up
the first and second best teams in the country in order to play a postseason national
championship game.218 Instead, each polling service determined their own
national champion and there were several years in which there were multiple teams
that called themselves national champions. 219 With the advent of the Bowl
Coalition and Bowl Alliance, there was an incomplete attempt at uniting the
game would still earn their share of the revenue for appearing in a game that would then be shared
amongst teams from its conference in the same manner as the BCS teams. Id.
215
Stewart Mandel, Behind the BCS: How Boise State-TCU Match-up Was Made Possible, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 1, 2010, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/stewart_mandel/
01/01/fiesta/1.html. Under the old BCS system, the 1998 Tulane University, 1999 Marshall University,
2000 Texas Christian University, and 2003 Miami of Ohio University teams would have qualified for
the BCS. Id. In 2004, the University of Utah became the first non-BCS team to crash the BCS under
the Top 6 standard when it beat the Pittsburgh Panthers in the Fiesta Bowl 35-7. Id. The game carried
the lowest television rating of any BCS game up to that point. Id. In 2006, the new BCS agreement
took hold and the Boise State University Broncos garnered a birth into the Fiesta Bowl where it stunned
the University of Oklahoma in overtime. Id. Since then the 2007 University of Hawaii Warriors, 2008
Utah Utes, 2009 Boise State Broncos, and 2009 Texas Christian University Horned Frogs have
appeared in BCS games. Id. 2009 marked the first time that two non-BCS teams have made it to a
BCS game in the same season. Id. The identifying feature of each of these non-BCS bowl game
participants is that they were all undefeated before being selected to their BCS games. Id.
216
Gregg Easterbrook, The BCS Doesn’t Always Give Us a Clear National Champ…and That’s
OK, ESPN, Dec. 4, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=easterbrook/071204. All
teams within the BCS conferences receive at least $1.5 million a year and can receive $2 million if their
conference sends two teams to a BCS game. Id. Additionally, Notre Dame receives $1.3 million every
season when it does not make a BCS game. Id. The conferences that do not send a team to the BCS get
ranked based on their season performance. Id. They then receive a pool of money to split amongst
their teams in amounts that decrease with a decreased ranking. Id. Easterbrook cited the MAC as an
example and stated that each team in the conference would receive only $200,000. Id. After the 2008
regular season, the University of Washington received more money after finishing the year 0-12 than
the Sugar Bowl Champion, Utah Utes who finished the season 13-0. What’s Wrong With the BCS?,
Playoff PAC, http://www.playoffpac.com/wrong/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
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BCS, BCS Background, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/about (last visited Jan. 15, 2010)
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conferences that were most likely to produce national championship caliber
teams.220 When it was realized that the Bowl Alliance would not continually
produce national championship match-ups, it was discarded in favor of the BCS. 221
At the conclusion of every regular season since 1998, the BCS has matched
up two teams in a game dubbed the BCS Championship Game.222 First, and most
importantly, the BCS was able to join the Big 10 and Pac 10 conferences in the
new system.223 Part of the problem with the Bowl Coalition and Bowl Alliance
was that the twenty one teams from the two conferences were obligated to play in
the Rose Bowl if they were champions of their conference, thus they could not
meet the top ranked teams from the other power conferences. 224 In order to solve
this problem, the BCS agreed to allow the winners of the Big 10 and Pac 10 to play
each other whenever there was not a conflict with the BCS Championship Game
and the other traditional conference-bowl tie-ins would be abolished.225
In order to choose these two teams, the BCS concocted its own ranking
system.226 The system is responsible for both choosing the match-up in the title
game as well as to help determine which teams will play in the other BCS Bowl
Games.227 The ranking system was designed to be an objective system that pairs
two teams based on statistical data.228 In practice, the ranking system has provided
a measure of objectivity, but by no means has it been flawless. 229 While the
rankings have periodically been shrouded in controversy, it has produced a matchup between two teams that have been named the national champion at the
conclusion of the game.230 Despite all of the potential flaws and shortcomings, the
BCS has delivered the unique product of a national championship game and in an
effective and meaningful way.231
In addition to fulfilling the goal of creating a national championship game,
proponents of the BCS claim that the BCS promotes competition in collegiate
football, helps to level the playing field, and increases public interest; 232 these
effects help college football generate more revenue. One of the loudest rallying
points for the proponents of the BCS is that the system requires teams to be either
flawless or nearly flawless in their record at the end of the regular season. 233 Since
the inception of the BCS, only one national championship game participant has
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had greater than one loss entering the game and no at large team has had more than
four losses before entering any other BCS game. 234 Furthermore, the only way for
BCS conference teams to ensure their participation in the system is to win their
conference championship.235 Moreover, teams outside of the automatic qualifying
BCS conferences are forced to schedule games against a higher level of
competition in order to score maximum number of points in the computer polls. 236
The system arguably provides the procompetitive justification that the BCS
enhances the regular season as well as the BCS Bowl Games.
One of the key aspects of the BCS is that it does share revenue amongst all
teams from all eleven conferences.237 Within the first eight years of the BCS, the
non-BCS schools received over $40 million as part of the agreement. 238 The funds
that they received were a mandatory dispersal regardless of whether the conference
they belonged to was represented in any capacity of the BCS games. 239 The
proponents of the BCS claim that this distribution of funds, while not completely
equal, gives those teams outside of the BCS a bite at an apple that they would not
otherwise be able to attain.240 By allowing teams from outside of the BCS to
receive funds they would not otherwise be able to attain, the agreement provides a
revenue sharing plan that only benefits teams that otherwise would have little to no
shot at making a BCS game.
Finally, proponents of the BCS point out that the public as a whole has
shown more interest in college football after the implementation of the BCS than
234
See BCS, Alliance & Coalition Games Year-by-Year, http://www.bcsfootball.org/bcsfb/
timeline (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). LSU won the BCS Championship game after the 2007 regular
season after coming into the game with an 11-2 record. Id. In total, there have only been nine
automatic qualifying conference champions with three or more losses after the regular season. Id. By
restricting the teams to those with a minimal number of losses, the BCS creates an extremely
competitive atmosphere amongst collegiate teams. Teams recognize that one loss, especially in a
conference game, can mean the difference between being included in a BCS game and being excluded.
For instance, in the first year of the BCS agreement, UCLA entered its final game of the season against
the Miami Hurricanes undefeated and number two in the BCS rankings. Id. After having their
September meeting postponed due to Hurricane Georges, the UCLA Bruins lost to the aptly named
Hurricanes 49-45 costing them a place in the BCS Championship Game. Id.
235
See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes 66-75.
236
An interesting case for this is the 2009 Boise State University Broncos. The Broncos began the
season with a nationally televised win against the Oregon Ducks on the opening night of the college
football season. Associated Press, Postgame Punch Mars No.14 Boise State’s Commanding Win Over
No. 16 Oregon, Jan. 16, 2010, http://espn.go.com/ncf/recap?gameId=292460068. The momentum from
that game propelled the Broncos to an undefeated season in which they secured an at large bid to the
2010 Fiesta Bowl in which the team beat the TCU Horned Frogs. Associated Press, Boise State Beats
TCU in Fiesta Bowl, BCS. Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.bcsfootball.org/cfb/story/ 10559502/Boise-Statebeats-TCU-in-Fiesta-Bowl. In that same season, the Oregon Ducks won the Pac 10 conference and
earned an automatic berth in the Rose Bowl. Associated Press, Pryor Leads Ohio State Over Oregon in
Rose Bowl, BCS, Jan. 1, 2010, http://www.bcsfootball.org/cfb/story/10553890/ Pryor-leads-Ohio-Stateover-Oregon-in-Rose-Bowl. It was these types of regular season, out of conference match-ups that the
BCS hoped would result from the knowledge that teams needed to play a strong, complete schedule in
order to maximize the chances of getting a bid to a BCS bowl.
237
See BCS Chronology, supra note 15.
238
See Kober, supra note 12, at 75.
239
See id.
240
See id. Under the traditional bowl tie in system, the teams not contracted to play in the most
high profile bowls – the ones that comprised the BCS – would have received no monetary
compensation whatsoever since they would never have the opportunity to play in those games. Id.
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before it.241 The growing amount of interest around college football should not be
discarded as an irrelevant procompetitive justification. In Hennessey, the Fifth
Circuit stated that there is true value in the increase of public interest in college
football.242 The Supreme Court affirmed the notion that public interest is a valid
procompetitive justification in Board of Regents.243 While the NCAA does not
play a part in the BCS agreement, the validity of public interest as a
procompetitive justification is still undeniable.
Since the implementation of the BCS, in person attendance at college
football games increased from 27.6 million to 37.4 million in 2009.244
Furthermore, in 2009, the BCS Championship Game captured an audience of 26.8
million people.245 The BCS compares favorably to the championship contests in
other sports as the 2009 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship received only
17.6 million viewers and the World Series between the Philadelphia Phillies and
New York Yankees received only 19.3 million viewers. 246 In addition, the
proliferation of sports talk radio, the growth of ESPN, the growth of the internet,
and simple word of mouth have also contributed countless hours and programming
space to college football that was unimaginable just twenty years ago. Public
interest certainly has grown and provides an additional procompetitive justification
for restricting access to the BCS.
c. Less Restrictive Alternatives
With the BCS and its member conferences able to show several
procompetitive justifications, the onus is on the court to weight both sides of the
argument and to undertake consideration of whether there are any less restrictive
alternatives.247 Throughout the history of the BCS, several factions have produced
plans that would lessen the restrictive nature of the BCS. The most prominent
alternative is to create some form of a playoff. This section will discuss some of
the basic arguments or aspects of these plans that could potentially be less
restrictive.
Because the stated goal of the BCS was to create a decisive national
championship game between the two best teams in the country each season, 248
Cowen presented a potential eight- or sixteen-team playoff system that would
include a greater number of contenders.249 He surmised that the playoff system
would allow more teams access to a championship game, would generate
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See id. at 77.
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1154.
243
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
244
Bill Hancock, Who Needs a Football Playoff? Every Game Counts in the BCS, TENNESSEAN,
Jan. 3, 2010, http://www.tennessean.com/article/20100103/SPORTS060407/1030327/Who-needs-afootball-playoff?-Every-game-counts-in-BCS.
245
See id.
246
See id. It is important to note that the BCS Championship Game saw a team from Gainesville,
Florida and Norman, Oklahoma while the World Series saw its teams come from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and New York City, New York.
247
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3rd Cir. 1993).
248
See BCS Background, supra note 217.
249
See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 49 (statement of Dr. Scott Cowen).
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excitement similar to that of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship
Tournament, and could still incorporate the traditional bowl games into its
structure.250 By implementing a playoff system, the restrictive nature of the BCS
in terms of crowning a national champion would be diminished.
There have been several arguments made in opposition of a playoff system
by the proponents of the BCS that enhance the notion that the agreement is the best
possible arrangement. Proponents of the BCS system believe that a playoff system
will have detrimental effects on the student-athletes in direct contrast to the
mission of the NCAA as it will take those students out of the classroom for a
longer period of time.251 Furthermore, the proponents of the BCS believe that
adding too many games would create anticompetitive effects as it would inundate
the market with more, lower quality football games that would not be as attractive
to television networks, advertisers or other revenue generating sponsors. 252
Finally, proponents state that there would be contention over deciding which teams
make the playoffs and which teams are excluded.253
d. Analysis of the Viability of a BCS Antitrust Violation Suit
While some changes were enacted to the BCS in 2004 as a result of the
congressional debates, the calls for change to the BCS have grown louder. If the
BCS becomes subject to an antitrust violation, there are ample anticompetitive

250
See id. While Cowen didn’t expand upon the value created by the playoff system, some of the
hypothetical arguments are easy to make. First, by having more teams play in what would arguably be
more meaningful games, public interest would be increased resulting in higher attendance and
viewership ratings. Second, the goal of deciding a national champion would be furthered in a vein
similar to that of the annual basketball championships. By including more teams in the championship
tournament, there is less of a chance that a deserving, competent, football team would miss out on the
opportunity to compete for the championship. For instance, the Auburn University Tigers finished the
2004 regular season undefeated, won the SEC conference, and defeated Virginia Tech in the Sugar
Bowl yet was excluded from the BCS Championship Game in favor of the USC Trojans and the
Oklahoma Sooners. Associated Press, Auburn Holds Off Virginia Tech in Sugar Bowl, NBC SPORTS,
Jan. 4, 2005, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/6783376/ns/sports-college_football/. This problem would
have been wholly solved if Auburn was included in the playoff system as they could have continued
winning throughout the playoff.
251
See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 49 (statement of Dr. Scott Cowen).
252
See id. at 50. The corollary to this argument is that, by having teams play either three or four
postseason games instead of just one, fans of the schools involved will be less likely to make separate
trips for each game meaning that with less fans from the competing teams flooding the city, those host
markets will not make as much money off the games as they had under the BCS system.
253
Playoff Problem, http://playoffproblem.com/wordpress/?p=88 (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). After
naming Bill Hancock as the executive director of the BCS, the BCS has begun reaching out to both
proponents and opponents using new social media. One of the websites that the BCS advocates is
PlayoffProblem.com which looks at various playoff proposals and how they would create controversy
far greater than the BCS. Under a system which uses objective rankings, teams could feel like the
rankings are unfair and that they are being excluded because of a bias in the rankings. Additionally, if
there were a selection committee, some teams excluded could point to a potential subjective bias in
determining which teams should be included in the playoff. One problem not acknowledged by the
BCS or PlayoffProblem.com is that all other sports in the National Collegiate Athletic Association have
selection committees that determine which teams qualify for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association Championships. This problem is consistently addressed by the selection committees as
they use both objective and subjective criteria to determine which at large teams should make their
respective championship tournaments. The problem is substantively the exact same one facing the BCS
or National Collegiate Athletic Association if a playoff system were imposed.

2010

ELIMINATION OF BCS SEEMS ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE

211

effects as well as procompetitive justifications to warrant a look into whether or
not there are less restrictive alternatives. A case would likely be decided on
whether or not the opponents of the BCS could prove that the proposed
anticompetitive effects are a result of the BCS arrangement and not of other
sources. First, the major powers of college football have always had more money,
resources, talented players, and media attention than those teams from the nonBCS conferences; the BCS hasn’t changed any of that. Additionally, those
bringing the suit would need to prove that it is the BCS that has caused the
negative impact on recruiting, the disinterest from top coaching candidates, and
lesser media exposure that they claim. If the opponents of the BCS cannot prove
that there has been a negative impact, they cannot win. Again, not only would the
opponents of the BCS be required to assertively prove these points, they would
also need to disprove the notion that these negative effects were either not
inexistence or were much more subdued prior to the BCS agreement. It is not
enough to assert that they are behind the BCS conferences; they have always been
behind and will need to prove that the BCS has put them so far behind that, if the
system were to continue, they would be forced out of Division I FBS football.
In addition to proving that the BCS has drastically hindered the non-BCS
conference teams, the opponents of the BCS would need to produce a
comprehensive plan for a less restrictive alternative. The plan would most likely
need to incorporate existing aspects of the traditional bowl system, an objective
ranking system, and a playoff system that would not interfere with the welfare of
the NCAA student athletes. While there are several hypothetical plans that have
been bandied about,254 none have addressed the economic impact of a playoff
system. Whether a playoff plan can continue to generate the kinds of revenue that
the BCS creates for both the BCS conferences and the non-BCS conferences is
unknown and would be extremely speculative.
While saying that the rich get richer off the BCS and that a playoff is what
America wants is the easy answer, it is clear that the BCS generates serious
revenue streams for all FBS teams. It is highly doubtful that an antitrust violation
of the BCS would be successful on the merits.
C. Further Developments
On January 29, 2010, the United States Justice Department responded to
Senator Orrin Hatch’s request for an investigation in to the legality of the BCS.255
The letter stated that the Justice Department would review the request and other
materials and then determine whether there should be an investigation into whether
the BCS violates antitrust laws.256 While the letter does state that the Justice
Department is willing to consider an antitrust case, the fact that the Justice
Department states that there are other alternatives is extremely telling about the
potential merits for a successful antitrust suit.
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See supra Part VI.5.c and accompanying notes 247-53.
Frederic J. Frommer, Federal Government Weighing Action on BCS, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
29, 2010, http://rivals.yahoo.com/NCAA/football/news?slug=ap-bcs-congress&prov=ap&type=lgns.
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In the letter, the Justice Department states that some of the other options for
solving the BCS “include encouraging the NCAA to take control of the college
football postseason; asking a governmental or non-governmental commission to
review the costs, benefits and feasibility of a playoff system; and legislative efforts
aimed at prompting a switch to a playoff system.”257 While none of these options
are exactly new, the fact that they are being mentioned with increased frequency
means that, even though an antitrust suit may be far off, other means of enacting
change to the BCS may be plausible.
V.

CONGRESS’ 2009 ANTITRUST DEBATE

Long before the Justice Department responded to Senator Hatch’s request
and made it clear that an antitrust lawsuit is far off and other alternatives should be
sought, Congress began searching for new avenues to end the BCS and to create a
more credible national championship. Congressional scrutiny ratcheted up
following the 2008 regular season and has continued through the 2009 regular
season.
During the 2008 regular season, it became apparent that the 2004 changes to
the BCS did not solve all of the problems of creating a true, decisive national
champion. At the end of the regular season, only one team finished undefeated,
the Utah Utes.258 Despite being undefeated, it was the Oklahoma Sooners and the
Florida Gators that topped the BCS Standings at the end of the regular season. 259
Both teams entered the game with one loss, but they had both won their conference
championship games.260 Despite being well qualified, University of Texas
partisans justifiably were upset at the Longhorns exclusion from the BCS; they
missed out on playing in the Big 12 Conference Championship Game because they
fell one spot behind Oklahoma in the last regular season BCS Standings. 261
During the regular season, Texas defeated the University of Oklahoma on a neutral

257

Id.
ESPN, 2008 College Football Rankings – Week 16 (Dec. 7), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball
/rankings/_/year/2008/week/16.
259
See id.
260
Pat Forde, Controversy Constant Along Annual Twisting BCS Path, ESPN, Dec. 7, 2008, http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=forde_pat&id=3753351&sportCat=ncf.
261
See id. Both Oklahoma and Texas finished the regular season with one conference loss. Id.
Additionally, Texas Tech finished the regular season with one loss. Id. All three teams play in the Big
12 South Division. Id. Each season, the winner of the Big 12 South meets the winner of the Big 12
North to determine the conference champion. Id. During the regular season, Texas beat Oklahoma 4535, Texas Tech beat Texas on Texas Tech’s last offensive play of the game, and Oklahoma beat Texas
Tech to create a three way tie at the top of the division. Id. The conference tie breaker states that the
fifth determinant in a three way tie situation would be the ranking of teams in the final BCS standings
poll at the end of the regular season. Big 12, Tiebreaker Procedures, http://www.big12sports.com/View
Article.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=1546006 (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). In the final
regular season poll, Oklahoma narrowly edged out Texas by a 0.0181 margin. See Forde, supra note
260. Despite beating Oklahoma on the field at a neutral site, Texas was left out of the conference
championship game and then the BCS Championship Game. Id. Further controversy would have been
sparked if Oklahoma would have lost the conference championship game and either the University of
Alabama or the University of Texas would have been next in line to play Florida, despite neither
winning their conference.
258
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site by ten points.262 After Oklahoma won the conference championship, they
moved on to play Florida in the BCS Championship Game.263 This controversy
provided political fuel for legislators to become enamored with the thought of
either changing the BCS system or passing legislation blocking the effects of the
agreement.
Following the 2009 regular season more controversy surrounded the BCS.
Five teams finished the regular season undefeated: (1) the University of Alabama
Crimson Tide, (2) the University of Texas Longhorns, (3) the University of
Cincinnati Bearcats, (4) the Boise State Broncos, and (5) the Texas Christian
University Horned Frogs.264 With five undefeated teams, the only way to
determine which teams were going to play in the BCS Championship Game was
through the BCS rankings. 265 The rankings determined that Alabama should play
Texas.266 The other three teams did qualify for a BCS game, but none of the three
had an opportunity to win a national championship. Under a playoff system, each
of these five teams would have had an opportunity to play each other in order to
win a championship; instead, only two of those teams were able to play for the
title.267
With these two recent seasons marred with controversy, Congress has sought
to directly and indirectly force college football into a playoff postseason format.
The rest of this section will examine proposals that are currently being examined in
various house committees and the potential impact they can have on the BCS.
A. House Resolution 1120
On January 15, 2009, Representative Neil Abercrombie, from the state of
Hawaii, reintroduced a resolution that denounces the BCS, calls for a playoff
system, brings parity to all NCAA teams, and demands that the United States
Justice Department bring an antitrust suit against the BCS. 268 Once the resolution
was introduced into the House of Representatives, it was referred to both the
House Judiciary Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee. 269
The resolution has not moved out of either committee nor moved to the House for
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See id.
See id.
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See 2009 College Football Rankings – Week 15, supra note 87.
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See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes 62-63.
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See Thamel, supra note 70.
267
At the beginning of the season, Texas was ranked second in the USA Today poll, Alabama was
ranked fifth, Boise State was ranked sixteenth, TCU was ranked seventeenth, and Cincinnati was
unranked.
ESPN, 2009 College Football Rankings – Preseason, http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/rankings/_/week/1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). With such a big lead in the polls, it was
inevitable that Texas and Alabama would end up in the championship game so long as they remained
undefeated.
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See H.R. Res. 68, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:
H.RES.68.IH:. The resolution was originally submitted to the House of Representatives on April 17,
2008, less than five months after the University of Hawaii was not selected to play in the BCS
Championship Game despite finishing the regular season undefeated.
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See id.
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a vote.270
While the resolution is high in rhetoric, it is not much in substance. The
resolution merely states widely held facts about the BCS and NCAA Division I
FBS football and then makes demands without much force behind them. Despite
the ineffectiveness of the resolution and the fact that it has died in committee, the
demands of the resolution were addressed in the Judiciary Department’s letter to
Senator Hatch. Despite lacking teeth, the demands of the resolution have been
repeated in other potential legislation and correspondence.
B. College Football Playoff Act of 2009
On January 9, 2009, Representative Joe Barton271 reintroduced a bill he
originally introduced in December of 2008 that, if passed, would make it:
[u]nlawful for any person to promote, market, or advertise a post-season [NCAA]
Division I [FBS] Subdivision football game as a championship or national
championship game, unless the game is the final game of a single elimination postseason playoff system for which all NCAA Division I FBS conferences and
unaffiliated Division I FBS teams are eligible.272

Additionally, the bill would make it unlawful for anyone to sell or advertise
any merchandise that refers to a particular game as a championship or national
championship game, unless the game comports with the single elimination
postseason format.273 Violations of the College Football Act of 2009 would be
treated as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 274
After being introduced into the House, the bill was referred to the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, a subset of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce.275 On December 9, 2009, the bill
was given approval in the Subcommittee and is currently awaiting its fate in the
full committee.276
270

See id.
Barton is a representative from the football crazed state of Texas. Joe Barton, Rep. Barton’s
BiPartisan Bill Works to Find “True” College Football Champion, OFFICE OF JOE BARTON, Jan. 14,
2009, http://joebarton.house.gov/NewsRoom.aspx?FormMode=Detail&ID=453.
Despite being a
graduate from Texas A&M, a direct rival of the University of Texas Longhorns, Barton recognized that
“[c]onsumers, whether the millions who watched the game on TV or the lucky few who saw it in
person, were being bamboozled. The BCS championship game is not a championship game under any
sensible interpretation of the manner in which sports champions are determined.” Id.
272
See H.R. Res. 390, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c111:
H.R.390:.
273
See id.
274
See id. The Federal Trade Commission Act regulates unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15. U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2006).
275
See H.R. Res. 390, supra note 272.
276
See id. The subcommittee approval was not without controversy. Representative John Barrow
from Georgia stated: “[w]ith all due respect, I think [Congress has] more important things to spend [its]
time on.” Subcommittee OKs College Playoff Bill, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story
?id=4727426 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). In addition to Barrow, BCS Executive Director Bill Hancock
said, “[w]ith all the serious matters facing [the United States], surely Congress has more important
issues than spending taxpayer money to dictate how college football is played.” Id. In response,
Representative Bobby Rush, a co-sponsor of the bill from Illinois, replied that Congress “can walk and
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While the bill has been praised for its direct aim at the current BCS, the bill
is not without potential pitfalls. The most obvious flaw with the bill is that it does
not create a new system or implement change to the system that has created any
inequities. By relying upon the marketing and promoting of the game and its
merchandise under the guise of a national championship, the bill only attacks the
perceived underlying problem of the BCS, the lack of a single-elimination playoff
system, instead of addressing the inherent unfairness that the BCS has created.
The problems that the non-automatic qualifying schools face are not discussed in
any substantive way.
Despite these concerns, the real problem Barton attempts to address is that of
giving the fans what they desire: a playoff. Despite this, and to paraphrase the
worn out cliché, Barton is simply arguing semantics with the BCS. By disallowing
the BCS to use the phrase national championship, the actual contest and agreement
can continue relatively unimpeded under a different title. In order to create
substantive change in the BCS, the bill needs to do more to break up the BCS than
to simply try and eliminate the designation of national championship from the
game’s title.
C. Championship Fairness Act of 2009
One week after the College Football Playoff Act was reintroduced into the
House, Representative Gary Miller of California introduced the Championship
Fairness Act of 2009.277 The Championship Fairness Act would prohibit
institutions of higher education from being “eligible to receive any Federal funds
for any fiscal year during which the institution has a football team that participates
in the [NCAA] Division I Football Bowl Subdivision, unless the national
championship game of such Subdivision is the culmination of a playoff system.”278
In addition to eliminating the distribution of federal funds to all FBS schools if
there is no playoff system, the Act states the bowl system can continue if it either
incorporates current bowls into the playoff system or creates a playoff system
completely outside of the current bowl system. 279 Since its introduction into the
House on January 16, 2009, the bill has been stuck in the House Committee on
Education and Labor.280
Unlike the College Football Playoff Act, the Championship Fairness Act
specifically requires the institutions playing major Division I football to institute a
playoff system. By employing congressional spending power, the bill is able to
effectively coerce universities and colleges to implement a playoff system. 281 The

chew gum at the same time.” Id.
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See H.R. Res. 559, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c111:
H.R.599.IH:.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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At the 2009 Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities annual conference, several
panelists addressed the need for additional federal funding if public schools throughout the nation are to
remain competitive. Jennifer Epstein, Funding Publics, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 16, 2009, http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/11/16/publics. With the current state of the economy, public
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bill has teeth that would force university presidents and athletic directors to take
notice and quickly scramble to implement a playoff system if it were to ever be
passed.
While it may be difficult to implement a playoff system under short notice, it
would not be impossible. The FCS has shown that it is possible for schools to opt
into a playoff system to determine a championship in football with minimal harm
done to the student-athlete. Each year, the FCS crowns a champion in a sixteen
team tournament.282 While the revenue streams and rewards are much smaller in
the FCS, it is possible for a tournament to take place. Furthermore, the Act allows
for the incorporation of the current bowl games into the tournament. 283 If the
expanding number of bowl games and the escalating television contracts for
Division I football are any indication, fans would still tune into all the bowl games,
sponsors would still line up to support the non-tournament bowl games, and the
television networks would still broadcast the non-tournament games.284 While the
revenue from these games would certainly be diminished, it is not inconceivable
that the revenue from the playoff games would more than make up the difference.
The cries that a tournament would negatively impact the bottom line of institutions
playing FBS college football are hollow. 285
While it is extremely plausible that the Championship Fairness Act would

school budgets are becoming increasingly tighter and funding from the federal government has become
instrumental in allowing public universities to remain solvent. Id. With the majority of BCS schools
being public or land-grant universities, the Championship Fairness Act would have a tremendous
impact on those schools that are benefitting the most from the BCS arrangement. Id.
282
Under the FCS system, there are eight automatic bids handed out to the champions of the Big
Sky Conference, Colonial Athletic Association, Gateway Football Conference, Mid-Eastern Athletic
Conference, Ohio Valley Conference, Patriot League, Southern Conference, and Southland Conference.
Inside the FCS Playoffs, http://www.printereagle.younce.net/playoffs/inside.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2010). The other eight playoff spots and seeds are determined by a committee of athletic directors from
FCS schools. Id. The process is extremely similar to that of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association Men’s Basketball Tournament and other National Collegiate Athletic Association sports.
Id.
283
For instance, if the BCS were converted into an eight game tournament, the BCS Championship
Game would still be the championship game and the four other BCS bowls would be able to serve as
either first or semifinal round games. Additionally, the remainder of the bowls would still be played as
a reward to those teams who did not make the BCS.
284
In August 2008, ESPN agreed to a fifteen year deal to broadcast SEC football for $2.25 billion.
Dave Matter, Big 12 TV Contract Frustrates Missouri, COLUM. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 18, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/sep/18/big-12-tv-contract-frustrates-missouri/.
In addition to the agreement with ESPN, the SEC has an additional fifteen year, $825 million agreement
with CBS. Id. Additionally, the Big 10 has a ten year, $1 billion package deal with ESPN and a 25year, $2.8 billion deal with the Big Ten Network. Id. Furthermore, the Big 12 has signed a contract
with ESPN for $480 million through 2016 and a deal with Fox Sports Net for $78 million through 2012.
Id. In addition to the escalating television contracts, the number of bowl games has increased three fold
in the past thirty years. In 1970, there were only eleven bowls. Dale Van Every, A Brief History of
College Bowl Games, COLLEGE-FOOTBALL.SUITE101, Dec. 13, 2008, http://college-football.suite101
.com/article.cfm/history_of_college_bowl_games. In 1990, there were nineteen bowl games and in
2000, the number had increased to twenty five. Id. At the end of the 2008 season, there were thirty
four total bowl games. Id.
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Just before publication, Yahoo Sports columnist Dan Wetzel released a new book called Death
to the BCS. In the book, the authors chronicled just how much money they estimate could be made if a
playoff were installed and what format would work best. DAN WETZEL ET AL., DEATH TO THE BCS:
THE DEFINITIVE CASE AGAINST THE BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (2010) (chronicling how much
money could be made if a playoff system replaced the bowl system).
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coerce the FBS into a tournament, the repercussions of not implementing a
tournament are extremely high. For this reason and others, the bill has not moved
out of committee. The political costs to legislators would be extremely high if they
supported the bill and a playoff fails to materialize. The damage done to
universities has the potential to be devastating. Under the current economic
climate, state sponsored universities and colleges are already having enough
trouble with budgets and funding that further cuts would be a doomsday scenario
for most politicians.
As of the writing of this article, the House bill as currently situated has not
been introduced into the Senate. As the months continue to pass, the likelihood of
the Championship Fairness Act being enacted into law are becoming remote.
Despite it being the best option of the three congressional proposals, the outlook
for congressional action looks dubious at best.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that, at least for the time being, an antitrust suit looks untenable
and congressional action looks to be too daunting. The question now becomes
what is next for the BCS? As it is currently construed, the BCS agreement runs
through the end of the 2013 regular season and is unlikely to be substantively
reformulated before the contract runs. 286 This means that the next step for the nonBCS conferences is to wait out the agreement, become such strong football playing
conferences that the other BCS conferences will need to recognize their football
prowess and allow them to sit at the BCS table, or to find some other solution.
By showing sustained success on the football field, the Mountain West
Conference has attempted to force its way into the BCS. In 2009, the Mountain
West submitted a proposal to the BCS to petition for a playoff system. 287 The
proposal called for an eight team playoff in which each participant was either an
automatic qualifier or selected by a selection committee.288 The selection
committee would be composed of a representative from each of the eleven
conferences and would also be tasked with seeding the eight teams selected. 289 In
addition to the playoff and selection committee aspects of the proposal, if a
conference had a strong enough showing over a sustained period of time, the
conference regular season champion would automatically qualify for the
tournament.290 As a result, each conference would be able to qualify for the
tournament and the automatic qualifiers would be based strictly on the merits of
the conferences. While the terms of the revenue sharing from this new
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com/ncf/news/story?id=3952542. The proposal called for an eight team playoff system and all
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arrangement were not made available, if we assume arguendo that the money
would be split in a manner similar to that of the current BCS arrangement,291 each
conference that automatically qualifies would receive the same share of money.
This means that the Mountain West would no longer be treated as a second class
citizen with a smaller appearance payout, but would take an equal share. This
would also apply to any other current non-BCS conferences that can meet the
threshold to qualify automatically. The complaints of the non-BCS conferences
would be muted because all teams and conferences would be able to prove
themselves on the football field. But like the other attempts to change the BCS,
the proposal was summarily dismissed by the BCS conference representatives.
Because the BCS will look to sublimate any proposals by the non-automatic
qualifying conferences in order to retain the status quo, individual teams have
sought out their own solutions. During the summer of 2010, college football
seemed poised for a seismic shift. Multiple reports surfaced, and it was confirmed,
that the Pac 10 had invited seven schools to fill six new slots and that the Big 10
had been actively courting the University of Texas, the University of Nebraska and
potentially the University of Missouri. 292 While the move to sixteen teams did not
fully develop for the Pac 10, the conference did add the University of Colorado
and the University of Utah.293 Additionally, Nebraska accepted an invitation from
the Big 10 in order for the conference to expand to the minimum of twelve teams
needed in order to stage a conference playoff game. 294 As a result of Utah’s
defection from the MWC, the conference invited Boise State University in order to
help boost the conference’s chances to automatically qualify under the BCS
standards.295 Additionally, Brigham Young University defected from the MWC to

291
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See Carlton, supra note 25. Current speculation is just that – speculation. But under some
theories, the biggest prize in conference expansion would be the University of Texas Longhorns, which
is a current member of the Big 12. George Schroeder, To Make Expansion Worthwhile, Pac 10 Must
Try to Land Texas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 12, 2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/
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become an independent;296 the MWC summarily replaced the Cougars with the
University of Nevada and Fresno State University. 297
The net effect of this conference realignment may signal the end of the BCS.
Both the commissioners of the Big 10 and Pac 10, Jim Delaney and Larry Scott,
respectively, have seemingly fired a warning shot to the rest of college football.
Both commissioners overtly stated that they were expanding their conferences to
improve their profile, yet, when examined critically, it appears that the root of the
decision lies more at the feet of economics than athletics.298 The traditional heavy
Big 10 and Pac 10 will open the doors to newcomers in order to cash in on a
conference title game.299 The move will generate new revenue streams as athletic
department budgets tighten.300 Furthermore, by bringing new television sets into
their television footprint, the conferences have created a more attractive package
for television executives and advertisers to consider in the next round of
contracts.301
The need for these revenue streams is simple: athletic departments are not
running at peak efficiency. In their book Death to the BCS, authors Dan Wetzel,
Josh Peter, and Jeff Passan state that “athletic departments of the ninety-nine
public schools in Division I [FBS] needed a combined $826 million in subsidies
just to balance their books in 2008.302 By those numbers, first reported in USA
Today, the average public school athletic department is operating at over an $8
million deficit. Furthermore, the amount of subsidies needed has increased twenty
percent in the three years prior to 2010 and does not appear to be letting up. 303 In
an era where football and basketball coaches routinely make over $1 million and
athletic directors can earn similar salaries with bonuses, college football is not only
struggling to sustain itself, but is no longer the cash cow that can provide enough
revenue for entire athletic departments.
With athletic departments all over the country facing tremendous deficits, it
will not be long before athletic directors and conference commissioners will need
to find new sources of revenue simply to survive. Obviously the status quo is no
longer sufficient; new options will need to be created and old options re-examined.
In their book, Wetzel, Peter and Passan propose a sixteen team playoff and surmise
that the overall revenues from their playoff system would at least triple what is
Selection Procedures, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819597 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
296
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currently being experienced under the current BCS and bowl systems.304 Even if
the revenue figures proposed are on the optimistic side, it is probable that a playoff
system would bring in significantly more revenue. That revenue would allow
athletic directors to balance their budgets without dipping into the school’s general
fund and to potentially bring back programs that have been sacrificed in recent
years.
While this is just one proposal, it proves that there might be other
alternatives available to conference commissioners that generate more revenue.
And if the economic circumstances remain the way they are, conference
commissioners, athletic directors, and especially university presidents will be
forced to reevaluate their positions. This intense look at the current situation and
examination of the potential revenue that a playoff could generate is the best
opportunity for college football to move away from the BCS and crown its
champion through a playoff system.
In the end, the opponents of the BCS and the proponents of a playoff system
face a long, uphill, and uncertain route to changing the system. For all practical
aspects, change to the BCS is highly unlikely under either the judicial or legislative
systems. Despite its many flaws and imperfect determination of a national
champion, it appears that the BCS will continue on relatively unimpeded for years
to come unless the economic situation becomes so dire that change is necessary to
save athletic departments and football programs. Until that happens though, it
appears that an antitrust suit would not be prudent and that Congress will do little
more than spew rhetoric while the teams on the field continue to play under the
BCS’ rules.
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